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Riot Control Agents and Chemical 
Weapons Arms Control in the 
United States
Sean P. Giovanello
Elon University, North Carolina
Introduction
Chemical weapons arms control has generally been a difficult endeavor 
for the United States. Various arms control efforts over the decades faced 
opposition, delay, and even defeat despite the morally dubious nature of 
chemical weapons. The issue of non-lethal riot control agents (RCA), for 
instance, usually appears as one of the leading aspects of these debates, 
whether it is in the form of interagency disagreement, pressure from vet-
eran's groups, or chemical weapons arms control treaty opponents within 
the United States Senate. Indeed, the issue of riot control agents contrib-
uted to serious opposition to ratification in the case of the Geneva Proto-
col of 1925, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during 
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subject of chemical weapons arms control at the international level and, 
more specifically, implications for the United States. The article examines 
how the issue of riot control agents has complicated efforts for the United 
States to enter into and ratify chemical weapons-related arms control 
agreements. The article provides an overview of chemical weapons, exam-
ines the relevant arms control agreements, explores why and how riot 
control agents influence debates over the merits of these treaties, and 
explains why riot control agents remain a contentious issue in chemical 
weapons arms control and foreign policy in the United States.
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the 1990s. In each case, the President and treaty supporters eventually 
acquiesced to the demands of supporters of riot control agents. As a 
result, the use of riot control agents remained allowable under certain cir-
cumstances by the United States military. In both cases, however, the 
legitimization of riot control agents for military purposes placed the 
United States outside the expanding international norm related to chemi-
cal weapons possession and usage. Paradoxically, the championing of riot 
control agents as a tool of war placed the United States outside the very 
international nonproliferation regime that the United States worked dili-
gently to support and deepen.
This article examines the puzzle as to why riot control agents, with their 
marginal military utility, have significantly influenced chemicals weapons 
arms control agreements in the United States over the course of multiple 
decades and eras in international politics. The article examines the place 
of riot control agents in chemical weapons arms control treaty ratification 
debates. The article begins with a brief overview of chemical weapons and 
the history of chemical weapons arms control, with an emphasis upon the 
role of riot control agents in these discussions. Specifically, the argument 
will explore the role of riot control agents in explaining why the ratifica-
tion efforts for two major chemical arms control treaties faced such seri-
ous opposition in the United States.
Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons are toxic chemicals that are designed to cause "death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."1 
The use of chemical weapons dates back thousands of years where they 
were used in Greece, Rome, and India, as well as the modern day region 
now known as the Middle East. Efforts to limit, regulate, and delegitimize 
chemical weapons date back to ancient times as well.2 In the last century, 
chemical weapons have been used both on and off the battlefield by both 
state and non-state actors. In some instances, cult organizations, like 
Aum Shinriyko, have used chemical weapons as a tool of terror. The most 
widespread and horrific use of chemical weapons took place during World 
War I, when both sides deployed chemical munitions. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union built up extensive stockpiles of chemical 
weapons throughout the Cold War. Efforts to regulate chemical weapons 
in the twentieth century included the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 
more stringent CWC, which entered into force in 1997. Regardless of 
these international standards and increased international pressure, many 
states have still refused to abandon their chemical weapons programs and 
destroy existing chemical weapons stockpiles.3
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Chemical weapons are generally broken into four distinct categories: 1) 
blister agents; 2) blood agents; 3) nerve agents; and 4) harassing agents.4 
Riot control agents fall under the category of harassing agents. Blister 
agents, such as mustard gas, cause burns and large blisters on the victim's 
skin. They affect the eyes, lungs, and skin of the victim. Blood agents are 
generally inhaled and affect the blood of the victim. Nerve agents, such as 
Sarin and Tabun, can produce a variety of effects depending on the 
dosage. These effects include choking, paralysis, nausea and 
hallucinations. Harassing agents are also known as riot control agents. 
They are generally not lethal and have been used in war time and for law 
enforcement purposes.
Riot control agents are non-lethal chemical weapons designed to 
incapacitate victims temporarily rather than causing long-term injuries or 
death from exposure. Tear gas is probably the most widely utilized and 
well-known riot control agent. Pepper spray, known as Capsaicin, is also a 
widely utilized riot control agent. Consequently, the debate over riot 
control agents has proven contentious as these types of agents are 
generally considered non-lethal, more humane, and are legally utilized in 
domestic law enforcement. International efforts to regulate the use of riot 
control agents, including the CWC, only ban the use of riot control agents 
as a weapon of war, but do not ban their use as a tool of domestic law 
enforcement.
Chemical Weapons Arms Control
While it is important to note that prohibitions against chemical weapons 
date back to the ancient world, the modern chemical weapons nonprolif-
eration regime begins much later in history. Efforts to regulate chemical 
weapons can be broken into three distinct eras: 1) Pre World War I; 2) 
Post World War I; and 3) the Cold War era and beyond. The key efforts 
and documents from each area are discussed below, with more detailed 
attention paid to two specific treaties—the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and 
the CWC.
Prior to World War I, efforts toward chemical weapons arms control 
focused upon limiting or regulating the use of chemical arms, rather than 
banning their development or possession by states. These agreements 
were not narrowly focused upon the issues of chemical weapons arms 
control. Instead, each agreement sought to codify rules of war and limit 
the use of certain tactics and weapons related to chemical use. These 
agreements included the Saint Petersburg Declaration, the Brussels Dec-
laration, and the documents produced by the Hague Conferences of 1899 
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and 1907. The Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868 agreed to by the 
Great Powers of the day, limited the size of projectiles that could contain 
"fulminating or inflammable substances."5 The Saint Petersburg Declara-
tion also placed a lower limit (nothing smaller than) on the size of such 
projectiles and, as such, allowed for the possession and use of larger scale 
artillery shells containing these substances. The Brussels Declaration, 
while never ratified, stated that poison weapons were "especially forbid-
den" under the rules and laws of war of the day.6 The United States, not 
considered a great power at the time, did not participate in either of these 
conferences and, as such, was never bound by the agreements. These 
early steps, however, were important in the codification of what would 
become an international chemical weapons nonproliferation regime. The 
United States would eventually participate in the Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907.
In the 1899 Hague Conference, the participants agreed to ban the use of 
munitions which carried poisonous gasses. The ban, however, applied 
only to wars between contracting parties and, consequently, fell far short 
of universality.7 All participants of the 1907 Hague Conference reaffirmed 
this principle, which stated that it was illegal to utilize poisonous weap-
ons. Unfortunately, these prohibitions did not prevent states from devel-
oping chemical weapons and, as seen in World War I, did not prevent 
states from using them on the battlefield. During World War I, chemical 
weapons were seen as a "versatile weapon" and "adaptable to almost any 
tactical situation."8 However, it is important to note that the prohibitions 
in these agreements, coupled with the lessons of World War I, laid the 
groundwork for future and more binding agreements.
In the aftermath of World War I, several steps were taken to ameliorate 
the threat posed by chemical weapons. These steps included the Treaty of 
Versailles to end the war, the Washington Naval Treaties and, most 
importantly, the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Treaty of 
Versailles forbade Germany from developing, possessing, or using chemi-
cal weapons of any kind.9 These international agreements, however, did 
not prevent the victorious allies and subsequent German regimes from 
building up their chemical arsenals during the interwar years. The Wash-
ington Naval Conference in 1921 and the resulting treaties primarily 
focused upon the limitation of naval forces around the world and, espe-
cially, in the Pacific. One of the treaties produced by the conference regu-
lated submarine warfare and the use of gas as a weapon. The treaty called 
for the banning of gas as a weapon of war under international law.10 The 
parties involved agreed that the gas provision had to be accepted unani-
mously by all parties in order to enter into force. The United States Senate 
provided advice and consent to ratification in a lopsided vote with no sen-
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ator formally voting against it.11 French opposition to the anti-submarine 
provisions of the treaty killed the agreement, but the idea of outlawing the 
use of chemical weapons remained a matter of discussion at the interna-
tional level. This conference served as a precursor for discussion several 
years later that led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 continued the process of limiting and dele-
gitimizing the use of chemical weapons in war. After the widespread use 
of chemical weapons in World War I and the horror such use engendered, 
public support around the world ran strongly in favor of outlawing their 
use. The protocol essentially banned "the use in war" of all types of chem-
ical weapons, but did not prohibit possession of such weapons. Further-
more, the ban reiterated the opposition to such weapons contained in 
prior agreements and also extended the prohibition to include bacterio-
logical or biological weapons. Interestingly, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
remains the world's oldest multilateral arms control agreement still in 
effect today.12 The utility of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was undermined 
when two key states, the United States and Japan, refused to ratify the 
treaty in the decade following signature. Further, other states interpreted 
the treaty as being limited to only conflicts involving state parties to the 
treaty and as a no-first use pledge rather than overall renunciation of 
chemical weapons in warfare. Ultimately, many states continued to invest 
in chemical weapons and retained the capability to deploy chemical weap-
ons in times of war.
During the 1930s, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 failed to prevent the use of 
chemical weapons in warfare. The Italians, in their conflict with the Ethi-
opians, and the Japanese in their conflict with the Chinese, both used 
chemical weapons on the battlefield in violation of the protocol. In both 
cases, the respective opponents lacked the ability to respond in kind to a 
chemical weapon attack or to deter one from taking place. It is generally 
recognized that the decision of other great powers to not deploy their 
chemical weapons in World War II owed more to deterrence than any 
specific respect for the Geneva Protocol or international law. Still, the 
existence of the protocol served as an important bulwark against the use 
of chemical weapons during wartime from the period of its signature until 
the entry into force of the CWC.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union 
maintained enormous stockpiles of chemical weapons as part of their 
strategic arsenals. Additionally, many other states around the world 
maintained chemical weapons arsenals, including Israel, India, Sudan, 
Egypt, North Korea, and Syria.13 Chemical weapons acquired a reputation 
as being a type of weapon of mass destruction accessible to more than 
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great powers as they did not require the massive infrastructure and 
technology investments that were considered prerequisites for developing 
nuclear weapons.
Much of the focus on arms control centered upon superpower arsenals 
and arms racing during the Cold War, given the dynamics and stakes of 
bipolar security competition. Nuclear weapons dominated discussions of 
arms control during the majority of the Cold War given the number, 
power, and importance of these weapons. However, chemical and biologi-
cal weapons were also much discussed and remained important in arms 
control negotiations. In 1969, facing criticism regarding the use of herbi-
cides (Agent Orange) in the jungles of Vietnam, President Nixon resub-
mitted the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for advice and consent 
to ratification.14 Further, Nixon pledged that the United States would uni-
laterally dismantle its biological weapons program and renounce the use 
of biological weapons forever.15 This decision made it easier to delink bio-
logical weapons from chemical weapons and conclude a biological weap-
ons convention in relatively short order. While this presidential action 
represented substantial progress on biological weapons, it still left the 
challenge of concluding a stronger chemical weapons ban at the interna-
tional level.
Throughout the remainder of the Cold War, multilateral efforts centered 
upon drafting a chemical weapons ban that would be acceptable to both 
superpowers and the rest of the international community. Negotiations 
took place in both the Conference on Disarmament, as well as directly 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The decline and eventual 
collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a relaxing of superpower compe-
tition that stimulated progress on the treaty negotiations. During the 
1980s, the Soviets relaxed their opposition to stringent verification and 
compliance measures as part of a chemical weapons convention. This 
unexpected reversal removed one of the key roadblocks to concluding a 
chemical ban that improved upon the Geneva Protocol, which had lacked 
a verification mechanism. The accession to this demand by the Soviets 
paved the way for the insertion of language that made the CWC the most 
stringent, intrusive, and demanding arms control verification measure 
adopted in a multilateral arms control treaty. The thawing of relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union allowed for important 
bilateral progress in chemical arms control. It also led to the 1989 Memo-
randum of Understanding pertaining to chemical weapons and a Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, the two sides agreed to share data on their chemical arsenals 
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and allowed for inspections of each other's chemical weapon facilities. 
The agreement also concluded with a bilateral agreement calling for the 
cessation of their existing chemical weapons programs.
Multilateral negotiations for a chemical weapons convention intensified 
in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, after reports of the widespread use 
of chemical weapon by both sides. This war also marked the first time that 
chemical weapons were widely used since World War II and raised inter-
national concerns about possible proliferation throughout the developing 
world. As a direct result of these concerns, the Australia Group was 
formed in 1985 with the goal of preventing the export of chemicals, bio-
logical agents, and equipment that would be used in the development of 
or enhancement of chemical and biological weapons stocks.16 The cumu-
lative effect of the Iran–Iraq war and the thawing of relations between the 
United States and Soviet Union allowed for the completion of the CWC.
The final draft of the CWC represented a major step in international arms 
control efforts, as it offered a framework for the actual destruction and 
disarmament of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The CWC, 
for instance, consists of twenty four articles that created a framework for 
verifiable disarmament. Furthermore, each of the parties to the CWC are 
committed to never: (1) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or 
retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone; (2) use chemical weapons; (3) engage in any military 
preparation to use chemical weapons; (4) assist, encourage or induce, in 
any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Conven-
tion.17 More importantly, convention participants also agreed to destroy 
any and all chemical weapons that they possessed and to refrain from 
using non-lethal RCA in war.18
The CWC opened for signature in Paris in January of 1993. Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger signed the CWC on behalf of President 
George H.W. Bush. However, given the imminent inauguration of Presi-
dent Clinton, the task of the ratifying the treaty fell upon the new admin-
istration. Ratification was expected to be a "no-brainer," given the strong 
bipartisan credentials behind the treaty, the long-standing perception 
that the treaty was in the national interest of the United States, and a 
belief that no senator would want to cast a vote that could be seen as pro-
chemical weapons.19 The task of ratifying the CWC in the United States 
proved far more time-consuming and difficult than anyone had previ-
ously expected.
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The ratification effort launched by the Clinton Administration, Senate 
supporters, and outside interest groups faced challenges that likely would 
not have existed several years earlier. Republican support for the treaty 
declined in a post-Cold War world in which the Soviet Union was no 
longer an overarching threat or had ceased to exist as a state. Many 
Republican Senators questioned the utility of the CWC to disarm rogue 
states, stem proliferation to additional states, and have any impact on the 
acquisition of chemical weapons by terrorists. Delays occurred as the 
Clinton Administration and members of the Senate debated the prohibi-
tion against RCA in the CWC. This debate was further complicated by the 
fact that the text of the CWC prohibited the Senate from attaching reser-
vations to the treaty, which would have been the easiest way to resolve the 
debate over RCAs. This delay had real costs as the Clinton Administration 
lost the political advantage of a Democratic Congress in 1994. The 1994 
midterm elections catapulted the Republicans into control of Congress, 
which placed Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond as chairmen of 
the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee respectively. Sena-
tor Helms utilized his powers as Foreign Relations chairman to link 
progress of the CWC through the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
Senate to a myriad of foreign policy objectives, an act that President Clin-
ton resisted. Furthermore, the CWC became tied up in the 1996 presiden-
tial elections as former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole came out 
against the treaty's ratification during the campaign. As a result, Presi-
dent Clinton was forced to ask Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to with-
draw the treaty from consideration in September of 1996. President 
Clinton would later resubmit the CWC to the Senate and subsequently 
launch an effective ratification campaign after the embarrassing failure of 
fall 1996. The CWC finally received Senate advice and consent in April of 
1997 and was ratified shortly thereafter by President Clinton.
While the issues surrounding the use of riot control agents were not the 
primary reasons for opposition to the Geneva Protocol and the CWC, they 
remain a controversial subject in terms of participation by the United 
States in these regimes and compliance with international law. This con-
troversy surfaced again in 2003 when President George W. Bush autho-
rized the use of tear gas in certain situations in Iraq. Bush argued that his 
decision was in line with longstanding policy in the United States and not 
a violation of international law.20 In order to understand why this has 
proven to be a persistent issue in the United States, it is necessary to 
review how the United States has interpreted the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
and the CWC.
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The Geneva Protocol
Despite the reluctance of the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol 
for over fifty years, president after president stipulated that the United 
States would honor the commitment made when the protocol was signed 
in 1925. While the United States debate over the Geneva Protocol in the 
1920s was driven by concerns about the utility of chemical weapons, the 
ability of the treaty to restrict their use, and debates over the national 
interest, the issue of RCA was part of this discussion. In the Senate's con-
sideration of the Geneva Protocol in the 1920s, Senator David Reed 
argued that:
"The whole purpose of a weapon is not to kill your adversary; it is 
to make him militarily ineffective so that the battle may be 
won…If in our next war we can anesthetize or temporarily blind 
our adversary, he may be as good as new the next day, but we 
have accomplished the same military advantage if we put him 
underground with a little wooden cross over him."21 
This statement mirrors those made in the modern era by proponents of 
nonlethal weapons, a category that RCA fall under. More specifically 
related to riot control agents, General Amos Fries argued the merits and 
wide range of uses of chemical agents in times of war, including "the use 
of tear gas for riot control."22 This did not prove the case nearly a half cen-
tury later when the protocol was resubmitted to the Senate as part of a 
new ratification effort.
The United States used chemical agents in Vietnam—both riot control 
agents (tear gas) and herbicides as defoliants—and faced widespread crit-
icism internationally. Critics of the use of these agents argued their use in 
Vietnam represented a violation of the Geneva Protocol and international 
law.23 Technically, the United States was not bound by the protocol as the 
nation never ratified the treaty. However, the United States had signed 
the protocol, not formally withdrawn its signature, and had stated as a 
matter of policy that the United States would abide by the protocol's 
terms. Due to this criticism, President Nixon announced that he would 
submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for consideration. However, 
Nixon made clear that the United States would not change its interpreta-
tion that riot control agents and herbicides were not subject to the terms 
of the Geneva Convention and could be used in wartime.24 Disagreements 
over this interpretation of the Geneva Protocol between the Nixon admin-
istration and members of the Senate resulted in consideration of the 
treaty being deferred until after Nixon left office. The task of ratifying the 
Geneva Protocol was thus left to the Ford administration.
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President Ford took up the challenge of ratifying the Geneva Protocol in 
1974. The administration took the lead, through the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in working out a compromise between the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of Defense. The 
compromise that was eventually reached dealt with the issue of riot con-
trol agents. The particulars were spelled out in Executive Order 11850, 
issued by President Ford.25 As part of the deal:
"The first use in war of riot control agents was barred, except in 
defensive military modes to save civilian lives: examples included 
control of rioting prisons of war; situations in which civilians are 
used by the enemy as a screen; rescue missions, such as retrieving 
a pilot downed behind enemy lines; and protection of rear-
echelon areas in order to, for example, protect convoys from civil 
disturbances, terrorists, or paramilitary organizations."26
The compromise and resulting executive order would greatly shape 
United States policy regarding the use or potential use of RCA in the years 
leading up to the signature and ratification effort for the CWC.
The Chemical Weapons Convention
The CWC was designed to be a dramatically stronger treaty than the 
Geneva Protocol. The treaty was designed to ban the use of chemical 
weapons entirely in times of war. The version that opened for signature in 
1993 included the strongest monitoring and verification regime ever 
included in an arms control treaty. The treaty also specifically addressed 
the issue of riot control agents, which had become the subject of disagree-
ment over the decades since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was initially 
signed.
The CWC addressed the issue of riot control agents in several specific 
ways. First, in Article 1, the text stipulates that riot control agents cannot 
be used as a weapon of war.27 The CWC next defined toxic chemicals as 
being "Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to 
humans or animals."28 Riot control agents were defined in the text as 
being any "chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in 
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear 
within a short time following termination of exposure."29 The text also 
specified that riot control agents may be used in domestic law enforce-
ment.30 Furthermore, any state attacked with riot control agents in a time 
of war could both report the violation of the CWC and seek assistance 
from the international community. The convention clearly stated that riot 
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control agents would be treated as chemical weapons under the terms of 
the treaty and leaves no doubt that their use in wartime is a violation of 
international law. However, the recognition that riot control agents may 
be used in domestic law enforcement raised questions as to whether a 
substance should be banned as a weapon of war yet allowed as a tool in 
law enforcement.
The issue of riot control agents proved to be a persistent challenge for 
President Clinton as he sought to secure ratification for the CWC. The 
RCA problem proved difficult to resolve and it was not until shortly before 
the final Senate vote that the issue was finally settled. The Clinton admin-
istration tried to settle the RCA issue before submitting the treaty to the 
Senate, but had to finally step back considerably from its earlier hard line 
on riot control agents in order to secure Senate advice and consent to rat-
ification. The administration faced substantial opposition from within the 
Department of Defense, as well as from Republican Senators over further 
limits on the use of riot control beyond what was contained in Executive 
Order 11850.
The Clinton administration was forced to confront the issue of riot control 
agents even before transmitting the CWC to the Senate for its advice and 
consent. Hoping to conclude a treaty he had pushed hard for before leav-
ing office, President George H.W. Bush had deferred "some controversial 
interagency issues," that would need to be addressed if the CWC were to 
ever receive Senate advice and consent to ratification.31 The controversy 
revolved around the interpretation of the CWC by the United States 
regarding riot control agents. This debate involved officials from the 
National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the State 
Department.32 At the center of this argument was whether the qualifica-
tions to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 set in place by the Ford administra-
tion would be reaffirmed by the Clinton administration. President Clinton 
hoped to resolve this disagreement before submitting the treaty to the 
Senate. If the administration could have accomplished this, it would have 
meant support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The support of the 
JCS has historically been considered of great importance in arms control 
treaty ratification efforts.33 Unable to resolve the dispute; the President 
Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate in November of 1993. This 
meant that the disagreement over RCA would move from the Executive 
Branch into the Senate, where it shaped the Senate's consideration of the 
treaty and complicated efforts by the Clinton administration to secure 
Senate advice and consent.
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The issue of riot control agents resurfaced again in June of 1994. Presi-
dent Clinton submitted a message to the Senate clarifying his interpreta-
tion of the riot control provisions in the CWC.34 The message, sent on 
June 23, rather than resolving the dispute in its entirety, essentially exac-
erbated it. The Clinton administration interpreted the CWC's provision 
that riot control agents could not be used as a method of warfare to mean:
•   The CWC applies only to the use of RCAs in international or internal 
armed conflict. Other peacetime uses of RCAs, such as normal peace-
keeping operations, law enforcement operations, humanitarian and 
disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue opera-
tions, and noncombatant rescue operations conducted outside such 
conflicts are unaffected by the Convention.
•   The CWC does not apply to all uses of RCAs in time of armed conflict. 
Use of RCAs solely against noncombatants for law enforcement, riot 
control, or other noncombat purposes would not be considered as a 
'method of warfare' and therefore would not be prohibited. Accord-
ingly, the CWC does not prohibit the use of RCAs in riot control situa-
tions in areas under direct U.S. military control, including against 
rioting prisoners of war, and to protect convoys from civil disturbances, 
terrorists, and paramilitary organizations in rear areas outside the zone 
of immediate combat.
•   The CWC does prohibit the use of RCAs solely against combatants. In 
addition, according to the current international understanding, the 
CWC's prohibition on the use of RCAs as a 'method of warfare' also pre-
cludes the use of RCAs even for humanitarian purposes in situations 
where combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as the 
rescue of downed air crews, passengers, and escaping prisoners and sit-
uations where civilians are being used to mask or screen attacks. How-
ever, were the international understanding of this issue to change, the 
United States would not consider itself bound by this position.35
This interpretation would restrict the future use of RCA in times of war. 
The controversial aspect of the decision is contained in the third bullet 
point. Essentially, the administration argued that under the CWC the 
United States could not use RCA to rescue downed air crews or in situa-
tions where civilians were being used as human shields. This represented 
a major shift in policy for the United States.
In making such a change, the Clinton administration faced significant 
opposition from members of the military establishment in the United 
States. This departure from the Ford administration's policy on the issue 
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of riot control agents set off what has been described as a "near mutiny 
among the Joint Chiefs."36 The administration, however, was eventually 
able to secure the support of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John 
Shalikashvili, and CIA Director James Woolsey. Both testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee as to the merits of the CWC even 
with the newly restricted interpretation of the treaty regarding riot con-
trol agents. This, however, did not take the issue of riot control agents off 
the table. The decision on riot control agents by the administration paved 
the way for increased opposition to the CWC and meant that "significant 
military and veteran support for the treaty would not be forthcoming," for 
the foreseeable future.37 Indeed, the Clinton administration was forced to 
reverse itself on its interpretation of the CWC regarding riot control 
agents in 1997. President Clinton chose to return to policy adopted by the 
Ford Administration, which would allow for the use of riot control agents 
against combatants to rescue downed pilots or in situations in which the 
enemy was using noncombatants as human shields.
The riot control agent controversy was not the largest challenge the Clin-
ton Administration and CWC supporters faced in their efforts to ratify the 
treaty. The end of the Cold War meant that many Republican senators 
questioned the utility of the treaty in a world without the Soviet Union. 
For these senators, it appeared that the major threat the treaty had been 
designed against had disappeared. Further, it was not clear as to how 
effective the CWC would prove in dealing with the chemical threat posed 
by rogue states and terrorist groups. These concerns undercut the biparti-
san credentials of the treaty during its time in the Senate. Furthermore, 
the delays caused by the RCA issue meant that the Senate concluded its 
session in 1994 without having provided advice and consent to ratifica-
tion. The result was a dramatically new dynamic when the Senate 
resumed session in 1995 under Republican control. This meant that 
securing Senate advice and consent would be far more difficult than pre-
viously expected. It granted Republicans control over the leadership and 
key committees, which has historically been tremendously important in 
the treaty ratification process. This meant treaty opponents would be 
chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services 
Committee. These two committees were tasked with holding hearings on 
the CWC. As one observer noted, "the administration's mishandling of the 
RCA issue is the primary reason that the CWC did not get ratified while 
the Democrats controlled the Senate."38
While the controversy over riot control agents is not sufficient to under-
stand why the Geneva Protocol and the CWC faced such difficult battles 
for ratification, it is a necessary area that must be examined in order to 
understand the important challenge any chemical weapons arms control 
Giovanello: Riot Control Agents and Chemical Weapons Arms Control in the Unit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
Journal of Strategic Security
14
agreement will face in the United States. The CWC is a disarmament 
treaty in that it seeks to prevent the development, possession, transfer, or 
stockpiling of chemical weapons by any nation. In theory, it represents an 
end game in chemical weapons arms control. However, given the inter-
pretation by the United States of the provisions related to riot control 
agents (among other issues related to chemical weapons and a host of 
states), it is likely that wrangling over riot control agents, chemical war-
fare, and arms control measures will continue into the foreseeable future. 
The 2003 decision by the Bush Administration to authorize the use of tear 
gas in Iraq provides an example of this that is worth examining.
Riot Control Agents and the Iraq War
The subject of riot control agents resurfaced during the Iraq War when 
the President George W. Bush authorized the use of riot control agents in 
Iraq in certain limited circumstances. Given that Iraq's suspected arsenal 
of weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical weapons, was one of 
the driving forces behind the invasion; the decision by the Bush Adminis-
tration raised the possibility of a public relations disaster if banned sub-
stances under the CWC were used by the United States in Iraq.39 The war 
in Iraq, however, provided an interesting test case in a post-CWC world in 
reference to the usage of riot control agents. For instance, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld raised the possibility of using riot control agents in 
Iraq in February of 2003. Rumsfeld complained that "In many instances, 
our forces are allowed to shoot somebody and kill them, but they're not 
allowed to use a nonlethal riot-control agent…There are times when the 
use of nonlethal riot agents is perfectly appropriate."40 Rumsfeld sug-
gested he would seek presidential approval for such a measure, in compli-
ance with the terms of Executive Order 11850.
The public disclosure that the United States was considering using riot 
control agents in Iraq raised a great degree of criticism both in the United 
States and abroad. Secretary Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration 
argued that the longstanding and stated policy regarding RCA warranted 
their use in this theater of operation. Such actions would be consistent 
with United States foreign policy since the Ford Administration and 
would be consistent with Senate conditions agreed to by the Clinton 
Administration when the CWC was ratified. The administration was con-
sequently able to cite past policy stances in the United States and also 
illustrate grey areas in the language of the CWC in order to defend its 
stance on the issue. In drafting the treaty, the definition of what consti-
tuted warfare was not clearly demarcated and, thus, it was somewhat 
open to interpretation, as where the line fell between warfare and domes-
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tic law enforcement. Opponents feared that the use of these agents would 
appear hypocritical, would undermine the CWC, and that the costs would 
outweigh the benefits of use.41
After President George W. Bush authorized the use of riot control agents 
in Iraq, the military would use RCA on rioting prisoners at a detention 
center outside of Mosul.42 On August 3, 2007, the Multi-National Forces 
in Iraq used tear gas against rioting inmates at the Badoush detention 
center outside of Mosul.43 This usage of RCA on this occasion was consis-
tent with Executive Order 11850 and the Senate conditions to the CWC. 
The limited use of these weapons in Iraq suggests that, while the United 
States reserves the right to utilize these weapons, the widespread use of 
RCA by the American military remains limited in the future.
Conclusion
Controversy surrounding the use or potential use of riot control agents 
has been a recurring theme in chemical weapons arms control efforts in 
the United States. This controversy existed during the Vietnam era, the 
efforts to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and efforts to ratify the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Even after the ratification of the CWC, 
the issue of riot control agents has remained a source of controversy as 
evidenced by the debate regarding the limited use of riot control agents in 
Iraq. Given the relatively limited scenarios in which the United States 
might use riot control agents in both the present and the future, it is inter-
esting to see the degree to which they are protected by the military and 
many influential individuals and constituencies in and out of government.
Despite the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the issue of 
riot control agents by the United States military is far from resolved. Even 
as international law in this area appears increasingly settled, the interpre-
tation by the United States of the CWC leaves the nation as an outlier in a 
chemical weapons arms nonproliferation regime it helped create. As 
events over the last several years demonstrate, riot control agents and 
other nonlethal weapons remain an area of interest for the United States 
military. It will be of interest to observe how this debate continues to play 
out in the years to come and whether or not it is possible to resolve this 
issue once and for all.
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